Abstract. Achieving data security and privacy in the cloud means ensuring confidentiality and integrity of data and computations, and protection from non authorized accesses. Satisfaction of such requirements entails non trivial challenges, as relying on external servers, owners lose control on their data. In this paper, we discuss the problems of guaranteeing proper data security and privacy in the cloud, and illustrate possible solutions for them.
Introduction
Cloud computing has emerged as a successful paradigm increasingly appealing to individuals and companies for storing, accessing, processing, and sharing information. The cloud provides, in fact, significant benefits of scalability and elasticity, allowing its users to conveniently offer and enjoy services at reduced costs thanks to the economy of scale that providers can exploit. Relying on the cloud for storing and managing data brings, together with all the benefits and convenience, also new security and privacy risks (e.g., [20, 25, 27, 34] ). In this paper, we address in particular the problems related to the protection of data and of computations on them. On one hand, cloud providers can be assumed to employ basic security mechanisms for protecting data outsourced to them, maybe even employing controls that would not be affordable by most individuals or small companies. On the other hand, however, relying on external parties for storing or processing data, users lose control on such data hence leaving them potentially exposed to security and privacy risks. Data could be sensitive and should be maintained confidential even with respect to the cloud provider itself that, while trustworthy for providing services, should not be allowed to know the actual data content (honest-but-curious servers). Even the integrity of data -or of computations on them -can be at risk as providers might behave not correctly (lazy or malicious servers). Protecting data and computations entail then ensuring both confidentiality and integrity. Confidentiality issues arise since data externally stored or managed can contain sensitive information, or information that the owner wishes to maintain confidential. Confidentiality should be guaranteed also with respect to the server storing or processing data, hence introducing complications in query execution and in the enforcement of possible access restrictions. In addition to the stored data, even users' accesses on them may need to be maintained confidential. Integrity issues arise since external servers storing or processing data could misbehave. Guaranteeing integrity requires providing users with the ability of assessing that data are stored correctly, computations are performed correctly, and returned results are correct. This paper is organized in two main sections. Section 2 illustrates confidentiality issues, presenting solutions for guaranteeing confidentiality of data in storage, enforcing access restrictions, and guaranteeing confidentiality of accesses over data. Section 3 illustrates integrity issues, presenting solutions for guaranteeing integrity of data as well as of computations on them.
Confidentiality of Data and Access Control
Guaranteeing confidentiality in the cloud entails ensuring confidentiality to the stored data (Section 2.1), enforcing of access restrictions on the data (Section 2.2), and maintaining confidentiality of the accesses performed on the data (Section 2.3).
Encryption and Fragmentation
A natural solution for protecting data confidentiality consists in encrypting data before releasing them to the external server for storage. Encryption can be applied at different granularity levels. In particular, when data are organized in relational tables, encryption can be applied at the level of table, attribute, tuple, and cell [7, 22] . Encryption at the level of tuple appears to be preferred as it provides some support for fine-grained access while not requiring too many encryption/decryption operations. Also, for performance reasons, symmetric encryption is usually adopted.
A complication in dealing with encrypted data is that, since the server storing the data should not know the actual data content, data cannot be decrypted for query execution. A possible solution to this obstacle consists in evaluating queries on the encrypted values themselves. For instance, homomorphic encryption solutions provide such a capability but support limited kinds of queries and suffer from high performance overhead. An alternative solution consists in associating with the encrypted tuples some metadata, called indexes, which can be used for query execution (e.g., [7, 22] ). Intuitively an index column can be specified for every attribute on which conditions need to be evaluated. Conditions on plaintext values, known at the trusted client side, are then translated
